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Is the EU Democratic, and Does it Matter?
THIS  FORUM  ORIGINALLY  CAME  IN the form of a roundtable I 
organized at the American Political Science Association 
meetings in Philadelphia (August 2003) in an attempt to bring 
together a wide range of views on the democratic challenges 
facing the EU. Amitai Etzioni questioned the sustainability of 
the EU if it did not become a truly supranational political entity. 
Philippe Schmitter insisted that the democratic defi  cit problems 
were real, and most pressing at the national level. I followed up 
on this, arguing that were the EU to be appropriately understood 
as a regional state, it would be clear that democratic legitimacy is 
much less of a problem at the EU level than at the national. Fritz 
Scharpf concluded by showing that one’s view of the democratic 
defi  cit depends upon whether one looks at the EU’s institutional 
functioning or its problem-solving ability. The panel generated 
a lively debate, and the audience was not disappointed. I trust 
that EUSA Review readers will not be either.
— Vivien Schmidt, Forum Guest Editor — Vivien Schmidt, Forum Guest Editor —
The EU as Test Case of Halfway Supranationality
Amitai Etzioni
GIVEN THAT FULL INTEGRATION OF even two nations into one 
polity is very diffi  cult to achieve, and limited supranationality 
is woefully insuffi  cient, one is bound to ask: can “halfway” 
integration suffi  ce? I defi  ne halfway integration as giving the 
nations involved nearly full autonomy in some important matters 
while providing nearly full control to a supranational authority 
on other important matters.
      The fi  ndings reported in my book Political Unifi  cation 
Revisited show that two of four attempts to form supranational  Revisited show that two of four attempts to form supranational  Revisited
states, the United Arab Republic and the Federation of the West 
Indies, did not develop the capabilities that my theoretical 
scheme suggested are needed for such an integration to be stable. 
As expected, both collapsed in short order. The third attempt, 
the Nordic Council, developed only low integrative capabilities 
but survived by doing little transnational work, leaving high 
autonomy to the member nations in practically all matters.
      The fourth case, and by far the most relevant one for the 
issue at hand, the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the European Union (EU) that evolved out of it, provides the 
most telling experiment. The EU is trying to largely integrate 
the economies of the different nations involved, but so far has 
allowed them to maintain political independence.
       I suggest that halfway integration cannot be stabilized.
The basic reason halfway, mainly economic, integration is not 
sustainable is that the libertarian model is erroneous. Society 
is not composed of individuals seeking to maximize their 
pleasure or profi  t, nor are markets self-controlling (guided 
by an invisible hand). People are not merely traders and 
consumers but also citizens whose sense of self is involved in 
their nation. Hence, when economic integration that benefi  ts 
their pocketbook threatens their national identity, people will 
tend to balk. Furthermore, in free societies, major economic 
policy decisions must be made in line with a nation’s values 
and politically worked-out consensus—or by other institutions 
that have acquired the legitimacy previously commanded by 
the national institutions. Otherwise the sense of alienation will 
increase to a level that will endanger the sustainability of the 
regime.
       Moreover, communities have shared bonds of commitment 
that make members care about one another and be willing to 
suffer for them, make sacrifi  ces they would not dream of making 
for non-members.
      The argument advanced here is not that the EU is not 
politically integrated at all. After all, there is a European 
Parliament, a Commission, a Council of Ministers, a European 
fl  ag, and some other shared symbols. However, the power of 
these institutions and symbols is very limited compared to 
the national ones, by practically any measure. The European 
Parliament is weak compared to the far-from-powerful national 
ones; the Commission is weak compared to the national 
governments; and the European fl  ag evokes little sentiment 
among most people. That is, they do not meet the important 
crowning criterion of supranationality—that the supranational 
layer be stronger than the national one.
      Also important is that these European bodies are largely 
international ones and not truly supranational ones. The 
Commission is composed of national representatives. Although, 
theoretically, the transnational parties of the Parliament represent 
like-minded Europeans across national lines regarding European 
issues, in reality these parties are largely controlled by the 
national parties that compose them. In short, while there is a 
measure of political integration, it is much lower than the level 
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is growing, political integration may regress, as the size and 
heterogeneity of the EU is about to be enlarged.
       Several European leaders hold that the best way to achieve 
fuller integration is not to construct a supranational political 
authority, say, through a constitutional assembly of the kind 
that preceded the formation of the United States, but to increase 
economic integration. This, it is said, would lead numerous 
groups within each nation to realize that their interests have 
become supranational and hence gradually to shift their 
lobbying, politicking, and loyalties to the supranational union. 
This in turn would pressure the EU to develop more EU-wide 
political powers to work out these differences, which in turn 
would build the legitimacy of an EU government. Call it a 
syndicalist integration leading to a full-fl  edged supranational 
one. The idea is, instead of a frontal attack and a bold attempt to 
jump from many nations into a United States of Europe, allow 
processes to unfold gradually, according people time to adjust 
to the new supra-national realities and for their new loyalties 
to evolve.
      The fact is, though, that such a syndicalist integration is 
occurring only to a limited degree. Most times, farmers, workers, 
and businesses fi  nd it more effective to lobby their national 
governments for special considerations (farm subsidies, for 
instance) than to lobby the EU Commission and Parliament.
      The continued high level of national rather than syndicalist 
commitments was dramatized in the year 2000, when the EU 
leaders met to reconsider the unanimity rule. The diffi  cult 
negotiations were about how many votes each nation would 
be allotted—not each European party. Moreover, the political 
integration scenario based on syndicalist integration ignores the 
fact that by itself syndicalization cannot provide the needed core 
of shared values, legitimacy, and consensus building.
      Last but not least, for a sociologist, the notion that a union 
would move at the same time to greatly expand its membership 
(and in the process the heterogeneity of its members) and
introduce a constitution that moves from nation-protecting 
unanimity to majority rule, is to maximize friction and minimize 
the chance for success.
      All said and done, it is my hypothesis that halfway 
integration cannot be sustained and that the EU will either 
have to move to a high level of supranationality or fall back to 
a lower one.
Sociologist Amitai Etzioni is University Professor at George 
Washington University and Director of the Institute for 
Communitarian Policy Studies.
The European Union is Not Democratic—So What?
Philippe C. Schmitter
WHY SHOULD EUROPEANS CARE THAT “their” Union is not demo-
cratic and that “their” recently drafted constitutional treaty is not 
going to change that situation very much? Intergovernmental 
organi-zations are not supposed to function democratically. In-
deed, they are all much less democratic than the EU. Moreover, 
there is not much evidence that many Europeans care about this 
state of affairs. The so-called “democratic defi  cit” is largely 
a creation of academics and intellectuals. We have just seen 
during the “Convention on the Future of Europe” that ordinary 
citizens did not seem to be willing to devote much attention to 
the prospect of constitutionalizing, much less of democratizing 
EU institutions.
      The primary reason for a concern with Euro-democratization 
is simple: far more than any other arrangement for policy-
making between sovereign national states, the EU has had 
a major—if not always recognized—impact on the practice 
of domestic democracy within its member-states. The 
expanding scope of its policy tasks and the more modest, 
but still signifi  cant, increment in its supra-national authority 
may have passed for some time largely unperceived by mass 
publics, but that “permissive consensus” has ended. Since the 
signing of the Single European Act and, especially since the 
contentious ratifi  cation of the Maastricht Treaty, wider publics 
have become politicized with regard to the EU. For the fi  rst  politicized with regard to the EU. For the fi  rst  politicized
time, “European issues” have forced their way onto the agenda 
of national politics, and domestic politicians can lose and gain 
votes as a result of the positions they have taken in Bruxelles. 
The new cleavages generated by “more vs. less” Europe seem 
to be cutting across traditional cleavages established by class, 
religion and geographic location and, thereby, undermining the 
coherence of domestic political parties and party systems. Even 
more surprisingly, an overwhelming proportion of prominent 
national politicians irrespective of parties have tended to support 
EU initiatives (except in Great Britain), but they have found 
themselves increasing disavowed by their previously obedient 
followers. Politicization, in other words, has tended to disfavor 
rather than favor further extensions of the integration process.
      The fact, as we have noted above, that the EU is not itself a 
practicing democracy raises the a priori likelihood that its impact  a priori likelihood that its impact  a priori
upon “domestic democracy” will be negative—not so much in 
undermining democracy as such, but in gradually diminishing 
“the accountability of rulers to citizens acting indirectly through 
the competition and cooperation of their representatives.”
      The impact of the non-democratization of Europe 
upon democracy in Europe is still a process—not (yet) an 
outcome. It has changed, albeit sporadically, with shifts in the 
functional content of the integration process and expansions 
in the compétences of European institutions. Moreover, those 
institutions themselves are not yet close to having consolidated 
a stable and legitimate set of rules, pace the efforts of the 
Convention. Even in retrospect, it is diffi  cult to point to a 
distinctive—much less a defi  nitive—contribution, since the 
net effect of supra-national governance seems to complement 
(and, probably, to enhance) trends that were already affecting 
domestic democracies. Indeed, the emerging Euro-Polity might 
best be interpreted as an exaggerated version of both the positive 
and negative features of “post-modern,” “post-national,” “post-
statist,” and “post-liberal” democracy in Europe. 
       But can this “transitional” situation endure indefi  nitely? In 
a book entitled How to Democratize the European Union … and 
Why Bother? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi  eld, 2000). I 
have argued that there are at least two good reasons why it may 
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sooner rather than later:
       (1) There is considerable evidence that rules and practices 
of democracy at the national level have become increasingly 
contested by citizens. This has not (yet) taken the form of 
rebellious or even “unconventional” behavior, but what 
Gramsci once called “symptoms of morbidity” such as greater 
electoral abstention, decline in party identification, more 
frequent turnover in offi  ce and rejection of the party in power, 
lower prestige of politicians and higher unpopularity of chief 
executives, increased tax evasion and higher rates of litigation 
against authorities, and skyrocketing accusations of offi  cial 
corruption. It would be overly dramatic to label this “a general 
crisis of legitimacy,” or to attribute responsibility for it to the 
European Union, but something isn’t going well—and most 
national politicians know it.
       (2) There is even more compelling evidence that individuals 
and groups within the European Union have become aware 
of how much its regulations and directives are affecting their 
daily lives, and that they consider these decisions to have been 
taken in a remote, secretive, unintelligible and unaccountable 
fashion. Europeans feel themselves, rightly or wrongly, at the 
mercy of a process of integration that they do not understand 
and certainly do not control—however much they may enjoy 
its material benefi  ts. Again, it would be over-dramatizing the 
issue to call this “a crisis of legitimacy” but the “permissive 
consensus” that accompanied European integration in its early 
stages is much less reliable—and supranational offi  cials know 
it.
      These two trends are probably related causally. Together 
they create a potentially serious double bind for the future of  double bind for the future of  double bind
democracy in Europe. If, on balance, the shift of functions to 
and the increase in supranational authority of the EU have been 
contributing to a decline in the legitimacy of “domestic demo-
cracy” by calling into question whether national offi  cials are still 
capable of responding to the demands of their citizenry, and if 
the institutions of the EU have yet to acquire a reputation for 
accountability to these very same citizens when aggregated at the 
supranational level, then, democracy as such in this part of the 
world could be in double jeopardy. Admittedly, the grip of this 
bind is still loose, but it is tightening. The national “morbidity 
symptoms” show no sign of abating; the supranational “permis-
sive consensus” shows abundant signs of waning. Between the 
two, there is still space for the introduction of democratic 
reforms, but who will be willing (and able) to take advantage of 
the rather unusual political space formed by monetary unifi  cation 
and east-ern enlargement (not to mention, the increasingly 
skewed outcome of Euro-elections) is by no means clear. The 
potentiality exists for acting preemptively before the situation 
reaches a crisis stage and before the compulsion to do something 
becomes so strong that politicians may overreact, but will it be 
exploited? One might have hoped that the “Convention on the 
Future of Europe” would have done so, but its resulting draft is 
far too limited and weak to make much difference. It looks to 
this observer that an important opportunity has been missed and 
I would not be surprised if European citizens, if and when they 
are called upon to ratify the eventual “constitutional treaty,” will 
end up rejecting it or, more likely, fi  nding it so insignifi  cant an 
improvement on the status quo that they will simply not bother 
to vote. 
Philippe C. Schmitter is Professor in the Department 
of Social and Political Sciences at the European 
University Institute.
Democratic Challenges for the EU as “Regional 
State” 
Democratic Challenges for the EU as “Regional 
State” 
Democratic Challenges for the EU as “Regional 
Vivien Schmidt
TO THINK COGENTLY ABOUT THE democratic challenges to the 
European Union, we need first to decide what the EU is. 
Otherwise, we are likely to fall back on comparing the EU to 
the nation-state, which causes problems for everyone. For the 
pro-Europeans, the EU will always be found wanting in power 
and democracy when compared to the nation-state. For the Euro-
sceptics, such a comparison raises the red fl  ags of “federalism” 
and “superstate.” For most everyone else, it confuses the issues, 
since we are left discussing what the EU is not. 
       I propose a better way of thinking about the EU, as a 
regional state. By this I mean that the EU is best understood as 
a regional union of nation-states in which the creative tension 
between the Union and its member-states ensures both ever-
increasing regional integration and ever-continuing national 
differentiation. As a result, the EU is and will continue to be 
characterized by shared sovereignty, variable boundaries, a 
composite identity, compound governance institutions, and 
fragmented democracy—in which legitimacy is as much if not 
more of a problem at the national level than at the EU level. 
       Unlike any nation-state, the EU’s sovereignty is shared 
with its constituent members. As such, it is dependent upon 
internal acceptance by EU member-states as well as on external 
recognition by other nation-states, policy area by policy area. On 
these bases, the EU has already been accepted and recognized as 
a sovereign region in international trade and competition policy 
but certainly not yet in defense and security policy. 
      The EU’s boundaries are more variable than those of 
any nation-state. Its borders are not as yet fi  xed with regard 
to geography—will Turkey be included? but then what about 
Russia? And its policy reach is asymmetrical—Schengen border 
controls, European Monetary Union, European Defense and 
Security Policy all differ in EU member-state participation.  
      The EU’s identity is more composite than that of any nation-
state. This is not only because Europeans identify much less 
with Europe than with their nation or even sub-national region. 
It is also because they imagine Europe through a plurality of 
national lenses.  
      The EU’s governance system is more compound than that of 
any nation-state. Although the EU looks something like a federal 
nation-state, its member-states have much greater independent 
powers than the sub-federal units of any national government 
while its decision-making processes are much more complicated 
as a result of the EU’s greater multiplicity of actors and points 
of interest access. Moreover, the EU’s politics looks nothing 
like that of any nation-state, not only because there are no EU-
wide elections for an EU leader, but also because there is very 
little real partisan politics at the EU level, with the little there 
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is submerged by the emphasis on consensus and compromise. 
       In this system, democracy is more fragmented than that 
of any nation-state. Instead of having a central government 
by, of, and for the people—through political participation, 
electoral representation, and governing effectiveness—as well 
as what I call government with the people—through interest 
consultation—the EU level emphasizes governance for and with 
the people while leaving to the national level government by 
and of the people.
      All of this together makes for big questions with regard 
to the EU’s democratic legitimacy, especially if the point of 
comparison is the nation-state. However, when the EU is 
considered as a regional state, in which democracy is understood 
as an amalgam of the national and supranational, the EU’s 
legitimacy problems diminish.
       Most importantly, the EU’s “federal” checks and balances, 
its voting rules requiring supermajorities or unanimity, its 
elaborate interest intermediation process with the people, and 
its consensus politics go very far toward safeguarding minority 
rights against the dangers of majority rule by the people (Scharpf, 
this issue). By the same token, however, those very checks and 
balances can sometimes undermine governing effectiveness for 
the people, given that the very rules that are ordinarily instituted 
with diffi  culty are even more diffi  cult to change. The lack of an 
EU level government of the people elected by the people makes 
impossible the kind of activating political consensus which can 
reverse even the most hidebound of rules in any nation-state
(Scharpf, this issue). 
      This absence of EU “politics” causes even more serious 
problems for member-states’ democracies. Because member-
state citizens lack a system in which they can “throw the 
scoundrels out” at the EU level, national politics take the heat 
for EU problems. National politicians often fi  nd themselves held 
accountable for policies for which they may not be responsible, 
over which they may have little control, and to which they may 
not even be politically committed. 
       Elsewhere, I have argued that the real democratic defi  cit is at 
the national level. This is so not only because national practices 
have changed—as the focus of governing activity has moved up 
while political activity has been submerged—but also because 
national ideas about democracy have not (Financial Times, 
August 11, 2003). The problem is that national leaders continue 
to project traditional nation-state visions of democracy—as if 
nothing has changed, although everything has—while generally 
leaving the EU vague and undefi  ned. 
       Politicians have understandably been loathe to expend 
their limited political resources on the EU, since it has been so 
much easier to blame the EU for unpopular policies and to take 
credit for popular policies without mentioning the EU. And what 
politician, after all, would want to admit to having lost power, 
control, or political direction? But this leaves national citizens 
more susceptible to those on the political extremes who do speak 
to these issues as they inveigh against the losses of sovereignty 
and identity or the threats to the welfare state. 
      The best way for national leaders to deal with the national 
democratic deficit is to engage in discourse and public 
deliberation that recognize the EU for what it is, a regional state, 
as they address the changes in national democracy directly. In 
light of the need to ratify any Constitutional Treaty that comes 
out of the current IGC, such discourse and deliberation is of the 
essence. Without this, the outcomes of national referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty could likely replicate those of the recent 
Swedish referendum on the euro.
Vivien Schmidt is Jean Monnet Professor of European 
Integration at Boston University.
Vivien Schmidt is Jean Monnet Professor of European 
Integration at Boston University.
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Contested Defi  nitions or Diverse Domains?
The European Democratic Defi  cit: 
Fritz W. Scharpf
THE ALLEGED EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT remains a contro-
versial subject in academic discussion and public debates. One 
reason could be normative disagreement. “Democracy” is a 
contested concept, associated with diverse ideal requirements 
and real-world institutions and practices. But that is not the 
only explanation. Given the complexity of the object of 
evaluation, it seems likely that different evaluators—like the 
proverbial blind men describing an elephant—may be looking at 
different domains of European democracy, and their seemingly 
contradictory evaluations might each be valid for the fi  eld on 
which they have chosen to focus. This is the hunch I will follow 
here.
       In order to partition the overall terrain, I will rely on two 
distinctions. First, discussions of a European democratic defi  cit 
may focus either on the EU level or on the impact of Europeani-
zation on democracy at the national level. Second, the assessment 
of democratic performance (whether input- or output-oriented) 
may focus either on safeguards against the abuse of governing 
powers or on the responsiveness of government problem-solving. 
If these distinctions are combined, they identify four problem 
areas on which authors might concentrate. While all of them 
are clearly relevant for discussions of the European democratic 
defi  cit, their specifi  c problématiques differ signifi  cantly, and 
there is no reason to expect identical conclusions in all of 
them. 
      The most sanguine view is held by authors considering the 
impact of the EU on safeguards against the abuse of national 
governing powers. There is no question that the Copenhagen 
conditions for Eastern enlargement had benefi  cial effects on the 
treatment of minorities, the rule of law and the effectiveness of 
public administration in the candidate states. Moreover, as Joseph 
Weiler has emphasized, under the supremacy of European law, 
legislators, judges and administrators in present member states 
have learned to respect European legal constraints refl  ecting 
the interests of their neighbors and the concerns of strangers in 
their midst. Given the evident “rightness” of such changes, it 
is not surprising that authors focusing on the potential abuse of 
national powers will emphasize the democratic surplus generated 
by European rules, rather than any defi  cits in their genesis. 
       Conclusions are similarly positive among authors like 
Andrew Moravcsik who are focusing on the EU’s capacity to 
restrain the arbitrary and potentially corrupt exercise of its own 
powers. Since checks and balances in the (continued on p.6) 
(continued from p.5) EU exceed the most extreme constraints 
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democracy, federalism, and reduced fi  scal competencies, there 
is indeed no reason to fear a totalitarian European superstate. 
       Democracy, however, is not merely about preventing the 
abuse of state power, but also about ensuring its responsiveness 
to the needs and demands of constituencies. Thus institutions 
that prevent tyranny by also preventing effective problem-
solving will produce defi  cits of output-oriented democratic 
legitimacy. That is not a problem where the European Central 
Bank, the Commission and the Court of Justice are able to act 
unilaterally. But otherwise effective European action depends 
on broad agreement among the Commission, the Parliament 
and national governments. When the stakes are high, it is 
easily blocked by politically salient confl  icts of interest or 
normative preferences among member-state governments or 
constituencies. 
      The obvious remedy, switching to majority voting in the 
Council, is not available for the most glaring problem-solving 
defi  cits—the lack of an effective common foreign and security 
policy, the inability to harmonize the taxation of mobile capital 
or to relocate subsidies from present benefi  ciary countries to 
the poorer new member states and, more fundamentally, the 
absence of common fi  scal, economic, employment and social 
policies that would match the perfectionism of European market 
integration. Yet if majority votes were able to override national 
opposition on these politically most salient issues, the lack of 
input-oriented democratic legitimacy could easily undermine 
past achievements of political integration in the European 
Union. 
       If that is so, national governments are left to cope with 
the problems the Union cannot deal with. But they must do so 
under the increasingly tight constraints imposed by European 
economic and legal integration. These may arise even from 
legislation that was originally adopted with the agreement of all 
national governments in the Council of Ministers. But once they 
are in place, European rules are protected against amendment or 
abolition by the same checks and balances which had ensured 
their consensual adoption. Hence when circumstances or 
preferences should change, neither the Union nor individual 
governments could respond to political dissatisfaction or violent 
protest. This lack of responsiveness may signifi  cantly contribute 
to democratic defi  cits at national levels.
       Moreover, the most constraining rules of European law are 
not even originally supported by intergovernmental agreement. 
They are the product of unilateral action by the Commission and 
the European Court of Justice, based on their interpretation of 
tersely worded clauses in the original Treaties. These interpret-
ations—which could only be reversed by Treaty amendments 
that need to be adopted unanimously and ratifi  ed in all member 
states—have extended the requirements of economic integration 
and liberalization far beyond the limits of political consensus in 
many member states, and they have severely limited the capacity 
of national governments to respond to the urgent demands of 
their constituencies. 
      The controversial literature on the European democratic 
defi  cit makes more sense if one distinguishes among its different 
domains. Issues of democratic legitimacy are nearly irrelevant 
for authors focusing on the normative constraints which 
European law imposes on oppressive or discriminatory national 
policies. Similarly, fears that the EU itself might develop into 
an oppressive superstate are dispelled by the high consensus 
requirements of EU legislation. By the same token, however, 
the EU’s output legitimacy is limited by its incapacity to act in 
the face of politically salient confl  icts among member states. At 
the same time, the ability of national governments to respond to 
politically salient problems is narrowly constrained by European 
law. As a consequence, the European democratic defi  cit is most 
manifest at the national level.
Fritz W. Scharpf is Professor Emeritus at the Max Planck 
Institue for the Studies of Societies in Köln, Germany. 
Fritz W. Scharpf is Professor Emeritus at the Max Planck 
Institue for the Studies of Societies in Köln, Germany. 
Fritz W. Scharpf is Professor Emeritus at the Max Planck 